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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
United States v. Ridling: The Polygraph
Breaks the "Twilight Zone."
In 1923, Dean Wigmore made the observation that "if [science] ever de-
vise[s] a psychological test for the valuation of witnesses, the law will run
to meet it."' That same year, however, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia, in the first appellate court decision dealing with
the admissibility of lie detector results, chose to run in the opposite direc-
tion. In Frye v. United States,2 the court held that the lie detector had not
achieved the requisite degree of scientific recognition to merit admission as
a reliable piece of scientific evidence. This decision became the corner-
stone upon which a substantial body of case law opposed to the admission
of lie detector evidence was subsequently built. Despite the weight of au-
thority against the admission of such evidence, a number of recent federal
court decisions strongly suggest the initiation of a trend towards judicial rec-
ognition of the scientific validity of the polygraph technique. This ar-
ticle will examine the rationale behind this new development in the law of
evidence in light of the traditional grounds used to exclude the results of
polygraph examinations.
In United States v. Ridling,3 District Judge Charles W. Joiner ruled that
the defendant in a perjury case was entitled to submit testimony of several
polygraph experts that, based on their opinions and interpretations of the
results of polygraph tests, the defendant had made his statements before a
grand jury in the belief that they were truthful. In view of the weight of
judicial precedent militating against the decision, 4 Judge Joiner held such
evidence admissible subject to the satisfaction of a number of stringent con-
ditions: (1) the defendant must submit to a polygraph examination con-
ducted by a court-appointed examiner chosen from a list of mutually ac-
1. 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 875 (2d ed. 1923).
2. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
3. 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
4. United States v. Tremont, 351 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 944 (1966). See notes 26-44 infra and accompanying text.
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cepted names submitted by the parties; (2) test results must be reported to
the court and to counsel for both parties; (3) the court-appointed examiner
will be permitted to testify upon a determination that the defendant is test-
able and that the test results reveal whether the defendant is lying or telling
the truth; and (4) conversely, if the court-appointed examiner is unable to
ascertain whether or not the defendant is telling the truth, none of the poly-
graph evidence is admissible. 5
The court ruled Ridling's evidence admissible upon an initial finding that
the polygraph was a reliable instrument for recording the physiological re-
sponses of an individual to stress and that "the scientific psychological
basis for the polygraph examination [was] well established."'6 Judge Joiner
considered the historical development of polygraphy into an organized,
well-recognized profession and took note of the widespread use of the poly-
graph by private industry, the armed forces, governmental security organiza-
tions, and most law enforcement agencies. The opinion made a significant
observation that cases involving the issue of perjury were most aptly suited
for the use of polygraph evidence:
A perjury case is based on 'willfully' or 'knowingly' giving false evi-
dence. . . [T]he polygraph examination is aimed exactly at
this aspect of truth. A subject . . .may be honestly mistaken
as to a fact and, if he answers according to his honest belief, the
operator will interpret the results as being a truthful answer. 7
The court confronted the traditional dangers inherent in the admission of
such testimony. The very standards that Judge Joiner laid down for the
admission of polygraph evidence went directly to the need of insuring that the
polygraph examiner be a highly skilled and qualified expert well versed in
the theory and application of the polygraph technique. By exercising its
power to appoint experts," the court reasoned that it would insure a truly ob-
jective interpretation of the results of the polygraph examination. The dis-
trict court found the polygraph evidence to be relevant as information going
directly to the issue of the defendant's state of mind at the time of the testi-
mony before the grand jury.9 Insofar as the evidence was in violation of
the hearsay rule, the court reasoned that the polygraph examiner's interpre-
tation of the polygraph record went to the truthfulness of the defendant's
prior statements, thus falling within the "state of mind" exception to the
hearsay rule.10
5. 350 F. Supp. at 99.
6. Id. at 93.
7. Id.
8. FED. R. CRIM. P. 28; FED. R. EvID. 706.
9. 350 F. Supp. at 98.
10. Id. at 99.
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The Ridling decision is one of several recent federal court decisions that
discuss in detail the probative value of polygraph evidence. In United States
v. DeBetham," the defendant was charged with unlawful possession of
narcotics, stemming from a search of the car in which he was driving at the
Mexican-American border. The owner of the car, Charles Bland, testified
that he and DeBetham had driven to Mexico with the intention of smuggling
heroin into the United States. In rebuttal, the defendant attempted to in-
troduce evidence of the results of several polygraph tests in support of his
contention that he had met Bland while traveling through Mexico and
that he was unaware of the presence of heroin in the automobile. Noting
that most past appellate decisions had rejected the admission of polygraph
evidence without examining in detail other evidence presented to justify its
admission, District Judge Gordon Thompson, Jr. thoroughly examined the
premises underlying the traditional policy of rejection, arriving at the con-
clusion that the standard set for the admission of polygraph evidence was
much higher than the normal standard for admission of scientific evidence in
general.' 2  Arguing for application of the normal standard of admissibility
of the results of polygraph examinations, the court reasoned that
, * . a polygraph examiner, having satisfied [the] court that he
is qualified as an expert in his field, should be permitted to pre-
sent foundational evidence . . . demonstrative of the polygraph's
substantial reliability and acceptance, in an effort to establish its
probative value. The procedure contemplated would permit the
reception of testimony concerning the particular polygraph test
sought to be admitted only after these initial hurdles have been
cleared, and provides for the exercise of sound judicial discre-
tion in the course of this inquiry. 1
Nevertheless, Judge Thompson, considering himself "constrained" by past
decisions of the ninth circuit,14 in the end excluded the defendant's poly-
graph examination results from evidence.
In United States v. Zeiger,'5 the defendant, an employee of the Federal
11. 348 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
12. "Any relevant conclusions which are supported by a qualified expert witness
should be received unless there are other reasons for exclusion." C. McCoR-
MICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 203 (2d ed. 1972). "All that should be required as a
condition [for the admission of scientific evidence] is the preliminary testimony of a
scientist that the proposed test is an accepted one in his profession and that it has a
reasonable measure of precision in its indications." 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 990
(3d ed. Chadbourn rev. 1970). See Kaplan, The Lie Detector: An Analysis of Its
Place in the Law of Evidence, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 381, 390-93 (1964) [hereinafter cited
as Kaplan].
13. 348 F. Supp. at 1384.
14. United States v. Salazar-Gaeta, 447 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Sadrzadeh, 440 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1971).
15. 350 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1972).
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Food and Drug Administration, was prosecuted for assault with intent to
kill a government secretary. Subsequent to a pre-trial evidentiary hearing,
District Judge Barrington D. Parker allowed into evidence expert testimony
on the results of a polygraph exam administered to Zeiger shortly after the
alleged crime had been committed. As in both the Ridling and DeBetham
decisions, the court applied the general standard of admissibility. On the ba-
sis of the expertise of the polygraph examiner and testimony by several
polygraph experts and psychologists verifying the accuracy of the polygraph,
Judge Parker accepted the defendant's polygraph evidence. In response to
claims that absolute scientific verification of the validity of the polygraph
technique in detecting truth or deception was lacking, the court noted that it
was not "concerned with satisfaction of [the] scientific standard of validity,
but with the legal standard of whether there [was] agreement as to a de-
gree of sufficient quality to assure probative value."' 16 However, the court
of appeals-reluctant to reverse the strong precedent of exclusion estab-
lished by the Frye decision-summarily reversed the order granting ad-
mission.' 7
I. The Theory of the Polygraph
One of the chief misconceptions concerning the polygraph machine is that
it somehow automatically signals the presence of truth or deception in the
examinee's response to certain questions. In reality, the polygraph merely
records on a graph the degree of certain specific physiological changes, i.e.,
pulse rate/blood pressure, respiratory rate, muscular activity, and galvanic
skin reflex, occurring during the polygraph examination. These data are in
turn analyzed by the polygraph examiner who compares the graphic record
of the subject's physiological variations with the questions presented to the
examinee during the course of the examination, and who ultimately de-
termines whether or not the test subject has answered the questions truth-
fully. Thus, the polygraph examination is in fact a complex relationship
among the examiner, the examinee, and the test instrument. While the
polygraph machine certainly is an essential ingredient, it is the polygraph
examiner-who interviews the examinee, designs the test questions, and
interprets the polygram-whose expertise is much more crucial to an
accurate diagnosis of the polygraph examination.' 8
16. Id. at 690 n.26.
17. United States v. Zeiger, 475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
18. For a full, accurate accounting of the theory, practice, and legal impact of the
polygraph, see J. REID & F. INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION: THE POLYGRAPH ("LIE-
DETECroR") TECHNIQUE (1966) [hereinafter cited as REID & INBAU].
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The fundamental premise underlying the polygraph theory may be sum-
marized as follows: A conscious attempt to deceive normally produces
emotional conflict which is revealed by a corresponding variation in the
individual's physiological state.19  These variations (in blood pressure,
breathing, and pulse rate) are readily discernible by the sensitive polygraph
instrument. Thus, the theory of polygraphy rests upon a dual assumption
that (1) there exists a definite relationship between conscious deception
and a subject's psychological state; and (2) this psychological state is ulti-
mately linked to the subject's physiological state.
The polygraph examination procedure commences with a pre-test interview
between the subject and the examiner in which the subject is acquainted
with the nature of the polygraph machine, the test procedure, and the pre-
cise order and nature of the questions that he will be expected to answer. 20
This interview also gives the examiner an opportunity to evaluate the sub-
ject's unconscious behavioral reactions to the test environment and to ob-
serve any behavior that may have an effect upon the nature of the poly-
graph record of the subject's physiological state. Test questions drawn up
by the examiner are classified as either "relevant," "irrelevant," or "con-
trol" questions. Relevant questions deal directly with the crime being in-
vestigated. Irrelevant questions have no bearing on the investigation and
are employed primarily to obtain a subject's normal reaction pattern. Con-
trol questions concern an act of wrongdoing of the same general nature as
the crime under investigation; these are designed to elicit a deceptive re-
sponse from the subject. 2' The rationale behind the employment of rele-
vant and control questions is that the truthful subject will experience greater
emotional conflict when confronted with a control question than he will when
he is presented with a relevant question. Conversely, the deceptive or lying
subject will react more strongly to the relevant questions than to the control
questions in the examination. 22
The probative value of polygraph evidence is present in any case wherein
the ultimate issue to be decided involves the truth or falsity of either party's
allegations. The evidence is not presented in an attempt to decide for the
19. Id. at 196.
20. Id. at 10-16.
21. Id. at 16-21. Each question is phrased specifically to elicit either an express
"yes" or "no" answer. Assignment of each question to a specific area of the polygram
enables the examiner to study the subject's physiological response to each question.
A sample polygraph examination would consist of ten questions. Relevant questions
would be assigned to positions 3, 5, 8, and 9; irrelevant questions to positions 1, 2, 4,
and 7; and control questions to positions 6 and 10. Id. at 21.
22. Id. at 125. Normally a sequence of tests, each one approximately three to five
minutes in duration, is required before a definite diagnosis can be made.
1973]
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court or the jury the ultimate verdict of guilt or innocence. Rather, it
deals with "... a collateral fact as to the [polygraph] examinee's aware-
ness of, and belief in personal participation in the act in question. '23  Thus,
most proponents argue that interpretation of polygraph test results by a
competent examiner should be dealt with in the same manner as expert testi-
mony in the fields of psychology, psychiatry, medicine, and the sciences in
general. As the court in the Ridling decision noted, polygraph evidence is
most helpful when dealing with the issue of perjury. 24 Another area in
which the courts are beginning to recognize the probative value of such evi-
dence involves cases in family law dealing with divorce, child custody, and
paternity actions. 23  The common element in all these case situations is the
issue of credibility to be given to particular allegations or testimony of the
parties in interest.
I. The Precedent for Exclusion
Most federal and state courts have traditionally refused to admit into evi-
dence in criminal cases the results of polygraph tests on behalf of either the
defense or the prosecution. 20  Various reasons have been given to justify this
exclusion, some of which being that the evidence is inadmissible as hear-
say,27 that the polygraph cannot be "cross-examined, '2 8 that no foundation
had been laid for admission, 29 or that such evidence would be viewed by
a jury as being conclusive. 30 The most prevalent reason for exclusion is
that espoused by Frye v. United States3 '-that the polygraph technique has
not achieved the degree of general scientific acceptance required to warrant
legal recognition of the polygraph as a reliable method of ascertaining truth
or deception.
Frye was the first appellate court case to consider the question of admitting
the results of polygraph tests into evidence. The defendant was accused
of and convicted of second degree murder. The issue on his appeal was
the exclusion by the trial court of the results of a systolic blood pressure
23. Trovillo, Scientific Proof of Credibility, 22 TENN. L. REv. 743-44 (1953).
24. 350 F. Supp. at 93.
25. See Pfaff, The Polygraph: An Invaluable Judicial Aid, 50 A.B.A.J. 1130 (1964);
A v. B, 336 N.Y.S.2d 839 (Niagara County Ct. 1972).
26. This article does not cover the doctrine of exclusion in civil cases. See gener-
ally Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich. 606, 50 N.W.2d 172 (1951); Herman v. Eagle Star Ins.
Co., 283 F. Supp. 33 (C.D. Cal. 1966) (polygraph evidence admissible in civil suit
upon written stipulation).
27. United States v. Stromberg, 179 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
28. Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 37 N.W.2d 593 (1949).
29. People v. Forte, 279 N.Y. 204, 18 N.E.2d 31 (1938).
30. State v. Cole, 354 Mo. 181, 188 S.W.2d 43 (1945).
31. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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deception test 32 offered by Frye as evidence of his innocence. The appel-
late court affirmed the decision holding that the lie detector had not attained
the degree of accuracy and reliability generally required of scientific evi-
dence. The court reasoned:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line be-
tween the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to de-
fine. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way
in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well recognized sci-
entific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is
made must be sufficiently established to have gained general ac-
ceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
We think the systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet
gained such standing and scientific recognition among physio-
logical and psychological authorities as would justify the courts
in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery, devel-
opment, and experiments thus far made.33
Most subsequent court decisions excluding polygraph evidence have echoed
the Frye standard of "general scientific acceptance, '3 4 and several cases in
particular have interpreted the Frye rationale to require a stricter standard
of acceptability for polygraph evidence than for other types of scientific
evidence. In 1933, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in State v. Bohner3 5 reiter-
ated the Frye opinion in rejecting evidence of the test results of a Keeler
polygraph,36 noting:
While [the polygraph] may have some utility at present, and may
ultimately be of great value in the administration of justice, it must
not be overlooked that a too hasty acceptance of it during this
stage of its development may bring complications and abuses that
will overbalance whatever utility it may be assumed to have. The
32. The lie detector device used in Frye measured only the subject's blood pressure
and was in no way as diversified an instrument as the present-day polygraph. In this
respect, the Frye court was probably justified in excluding the evidence.
33. 293 F. at 1014 (emphasis added). The Frye decision was factually wrong since
another person subsequently confessed to the murder three years after Frye had begun
serving his prison sentence. See 14th Annual Report of the New York Judicial Coun-
cil 265 (1948), reported in Wicker, The Polygraph Truth Test and the Law of Evidence,
22 TENN. L. REV. 711, 715 (1953).
34. Six of the eleven federal circuits have specifically rejected the admission of
polygraph evidence. The following states have likewise ruled for exclusion: Alaska,
Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Mary-
land, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
35. 210 Wis. 651, 246 N.W. 314 (1933).
36. The Keeler polygraph was the first of the modern-day lie detector machines de-
signed to record simultaneously a number of different physiological responses. REiD &
INBAU 3.
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present necessity for elaborate exposition of its theory and demon-
stration of its practical working, in order to convince the jury of
its probative tendencies, together with the possibility of attacks
upon the soundness of its underlying theory and its practical use-
fulness, may easily result in a trial of the lie detector rather than the
issues in the cause. 37
The standard of admissibility espoused by Bohner added the element of
"possible attacks" on the theory of polygraphy, thus implying that a stand-
ard greater than "general scientific acceptance" was required before the re-
sults of polygraph examinations could be introduced as evidence. People v.
Forte38 likewise interpreted Frye as requiring of the polygraph a higher stand-
ard of admissibility:
We cannot take judicial notice that this instrument [the poly-
graph] is or is not effective for the purpose of determining the
truth. Can it be depended upon to operate with complete success
on persons of varying emotional stability? The record is devoid
of evidence tending to show a general scientific recognition that
the pathometer possesses efficacy.8 9
Forte thus introduced the criteria of "judicial notice" and assurance of com-
plete success into the standard of admissibility, an element clearly contrary
to the general degree of scientific acceptance necessary for the admissibility of
scientific evidence. 40  It may well be argued that these cases create a stand-
ard of admissibility for the polygraph that requires not only general scien-
tific acceptance but also general scientific infallibility.
In view of the general rule of exclusion, courts usually have refused col-
lateral evidence of polygraph examinations where such evidence makes ref-
erence to the fact that a test was conducted 41 or to the willingness 42 or re-
fusal48 of the subject to submit to such a test. However, a failure of op-
posing counsel to object to the introduction of such evidence or to move for a
mistrial may act as an effective waiver of the right of exclusion. 44
A. Stipulation As A Ground for Admission
While the general rule is for total exclusion of polygraph evidence, a mi-
nority of jurisdictions presently allow admission of polygraph test results
37. 210 Wis. at 658, 246 N.W. at 317-18 (emphasis added).
38. 279 N.Y. 204, 18 N.E.2d 31 (1938).
39. Id. at 206, 18 N.E.2d at 32 (emphasis added).
40. See Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 1970
U. ILL. L.F. 1, 9 (1970).
41. People v. Aragon, 154 Cal. App. 2d 646, 316 P.2d 370 (1957).
42. State v. Anderson, 261 Minn. 431, 113 N.W.2d 4 (1962).
43. State v. Driver, 38 N.J. 255, 183 A.2d 655 (1962).
44. REED & INBAu 245. See Jenkins v. United States, 251 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1958).
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where both parties have stipulated that the evidence could be used by either
side. 45  People v. Houser46 was the first important appellate court deci-
sion to uphold the admission of polygraph evidence where there existed a
signed, written stipulation. The court held that the defendant was bound by
the stipulation he had signed with his attorney's approval to permit use by
either side of the results of a polygraph exam. Denying the defendant's
appeal that the evidence was inadmissible, regardless of the presence of a
stipulation, the court reasoned that
[ilt would be difficult to hold that defendant should now be per-
mitted on this appeal to take advantage of any claim that such
operator was not an expert and that as to the results of the test
such evidence was inadmissible, merely because it happened to
indicate that he was not telling the truth. ... 47
In State v. Valdez,48 the Arizona Supreme Court likewise held that evidence
of the results of polygraph exams were admissible upon stipulation subject
to the following procedural limitations:
(1) Existence of a written stipulation signed by the defendant and counsel
for both sides attesting to the defendant's voluntary submission to
the test and the right of both parties to admit into evidence at trial the
polygram record and the examiner's diagnosis of the results.
(2) Absolute discretion of the trial judge to admit or exclude the evidence,
regardless of the stipulation.
(3) Upon admission, the right of opposing counsel to cross-examine the
polygraph operator as to
(i) his experience and training,
(ii) the nature of the test conditions,
(iii) the degree of accuracy and probability of error in the polygraph
technique, and
(iv) other issues determined by the trial judge to be relevant to the
case.
(4) Jury instruction to the effect that the polygraph evidence only goes to
45. Presently, five, and possibly six (Illinois), states allow for the use of polygraph
evidence when accompanied by a formal written stipulation: State v. Valdez, 91
Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962); People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P.2d 937
(1948); Butler v. State, 228 So. 2d 421 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); State v. McNamara,
252 Iowa 19, 104 N.W.2d 568 (1960); State v. Fields, 434 S.W.2d 507 (Mo. 1968);
People v. Potts, 74 I11. App. 2d 301, 220 N.E.2d 251 (1966).
46. 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P.2d 937 (1948).
47. Id. at 695, 193 P.2d at 942. Contra, Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich. 606, 50 N.W.2d
172 (1951).
48. 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962).
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the issue of the defendant's truth or deception at the time of the exam-
ination-not to the issue of defendant's guilt or innocence. Its prob-
ative weight is for the jury to decide. 49
The significance of the Valdez decision is that it was the only decision prior to
United States v. Ridling to set down a list of specific guidelines on the proper
procedure and circumstances under which the results and expert testimony
regarding polygraph examinations could be admitted into evidence. The
decision went further in substituting the practice of judicial discretion for the
rule of absolute exclusion of polygraph evidence, thus permitting the presen-
tation of expert testimony to lay a foundation to establish the reliability
of the polygraph technique.
The rationale behind the practice of admitting stipulated polygraph evi-
dence while, at the same time, excluding similar evidence without a stipu-
lation rests primarily on practical, as opposed to theoretical, considera-
tions. The presence of a stipulation usually suggests that neither party has
a particularly strong case against the other. Where neither side is able to
win on a preponderance of the evidence, a greater chance exists that the jury
or the court may reach an incorrect or arbitrary decision. 50 Stipulation
manifests the intention of the opposing attorneys to gain a decision based
upon more than meager and contradictory evidence. In addition, the stipula-
tion in itself is indirect evidence that the polygraph examiner named therein
possesses a satisfactory degree of professional competenc since the ex-
aminer presumably meets the approval of both opposing attorneys. 51
A more theoretical outlook on the distinction between stipulated and un-
stipulated polygraph evidence reveals the dilemma sometimes confronted by
the courts in electing between honoring the practice of stipulation and up-
holding the strong judicial policy of exclusion:
A court with a deep and compelling philosophy against admission
of polygraph data may find the policy and procedural argu-
ments for honoring such a stipulation insufficient to overcome
the court's intrinsic objections to such evidence. Conversely, a
properly-executed stipulation may supply a basis for limited ad-
mission of polygraphic evidence when the court is less philoso-
phically hostile and is willing to use the stipulation as a tool to
break the solid wall of stare decisis. 52
49. Id. at 283-84, 371 P.2d at 900-01.
50. See Note, The Polygraph Revisited: An Argument for Admissibility, 4 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 111, 124 (1969).
51. REID & INBAU 247-48.
52. Note, The Polygraph Technique-A Selective Analysis, 20 DRAKE L. REV.
330, 342 (1971).
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III. A Reexamination of the Rule of Exclusion
The Frye rule of exclusion, followed by its strict interpretation in later
court opinions, clearly set a higher standard of admissibility for the poly-
graph in comparison with the general standard imposed upon other types of
scientific evidence. One consequence of this development was the failure
of most all subsequent polygraph cases to examine closely the efforts of
the parties involved to lay an adequate foundation for the admission of poly-
graph evidence under the Frye standard of admissibility. Beyond men-
tion of the Frye rule and prior cases of exclusion, most polygraph cases
have provided few reasons, if any, for summarily rejecting unstipulated
polygraph evidence.5 3  Other factors that have influenced these court deci-
sions include the lack of uniform professional standards for polygraph ex-
aminers, the presence of abnormal physiological and/or psychological symp-
toms in the examinee, the prejudicial effect of polygraph evidence on the
jury, and the possible violation of the defendant's constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination.
A. Frye Reconsidered
Most legal scholars agree that the Frye court was justified in excluding lie
detector results from evidence. The year was 1923, and the science of poly-
graphy was in its infancy. 54 Whether or not polygraphy has become an es-
tablished field of science and technology in the fifty years since Frye and
has occupied a position capable of satisfying the standard of "general sci-
entific acceptability" is the primary issue today.55
As stated previously, polygraph theory rests essentially upon the twofold
premise that 1) conscious deception affects a person's psychological state of
mind which in turn is reflected in the person's physiological state, and 2)
this physiological state may be accurately recorded by a polygraph instru-
ment.56 While most scientists acknowledge the ability of the polygraph to
measure the degree of a person's physiological changes,5 7 the major area of
53. United States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. at 1379.
54. United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. at 688.
55. For arguments in favor of admissibility, see generally Wicker, The Polygraph
Truth Test and the Law of Evidence, 22 TENN. L. REV. 711 (1953); Burack, A Critical
Analysis of the Theory, Method, and Limitations of the "Lie Detector," 46 J. CRIM.
L.C. & P.S. 414 (1955); Horvath & Reid, The Reliability of Polygraph Examiner
Diagnosis of Truth and Deception, 62 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 276 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Horvath & Reid]. Contra, Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence:
An Analysis of Lie-Detection, 70 YALE L.J. 694 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Skolnick];
Highleyman, The Deceptive Certainty of the "Lie Detector," 10 HAsTNGs L.J. 47
(1958); Forkosch, The Lie Detector and the Courts, 16 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 202 (1939).
56. See notes 18-19 supra and accompanying text.
57. Supra note 53, at 1381.
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dispute has been the validity of the premise that there is a measurable re-
lationship between conscious deception and a person's physiological state.58
This criticism is, for the most part, an unavoidable consequence of the em-
pirical nature of the development of polygraphy. Discovery of the fact that
truth or deception was measurable in terms of a person's physiological con-
dition was made long before a rational scientific explanation of this phenome-
non.59 Nevertheless, science, as well as the courts, has recognized at least a
limited validity and usefulness in the polygraph technique for conducting
criminal investigations. 0
In view of the duty of the courts to discover all pertinent facts surround-
ing the occurrence or transaction at issue, the general standard employed to
determine the admissibility of evidence accepts all facts of probative value
that are relevant to the issue to be decided,6' subject to a number of policy
factors that may weigh against its admission-i.e. the danger of unfair prej-
udice to the party's position, the confusion of issues, and the danger of
misleading the jury.62 It is left to the discretion of the trial judge to weigh
the value of the relevant evidence against the possible prejudicial effects of
its admission. Normally, the general standard of admissibility is applied to
scientific evidence after the party offering such evidence has shown: 1)
that the method employed to obtain the evidence has gained general scien-
tific recognition; 2) that the test has been conducted in a manner evidenc-
ing the achievement of an accurate result; and 3) that the examiner con-
ducting the test and interpreting its results satisfies the requirements of
an expert witness. 68 Assuming that the court admits the evidence, the jury
considers the degree of scientific recognition of the test theory in determin-
ing the amount of weight it will attach to the scientific evidence in deciding
the issue(s) of the case. Thus, the issue of the reliability of the scientific
evidence goes to its weight and not to its admissibility.
A review of the Frye, Bohner, and Forte cases clearly reveals that the
courts require a higher standard of admissibility in the case of polygraph
evidence:
58. Skolnick 700-02.
59. A similar situation exists with the revitalized medical practice of acupuncture.
Physicians acknowledge the usefulness of the technique in relieving pain, but they re-
main unable to explain the scientific reasons behind the success of the treatment.
See generally NEWSWEEK, Aug. 14, 1972, at 48.
60. REID & INBAU 234.
61. FED. R. EviD. 401.
62. FED. R. Evm. 403.
63. United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. at 94-95. Contra, State v. Lowry, 163
Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147 (1947), where the court felt that the analogy between poly-
graph evidence and other types of scientific evidence was invalid because the polygraph
apparatus records psychological data while other types of scientific instruments record
physical data.
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Rather than considering the probative value of the evidence to
see if it is prima facie admissible and then the policies which
weigh against admission, the courts assume that the evidence
should be excluded unless it is shown that the lie detector has re-
ceived "general scientific acceptance" or is "infallible." In this
way, the courts fail to identify the policy considerations against ad-
mission and hinder constructive attempts to provide safeguards
against the dangers feared. 64
The requirement of "general scientific acceptance . . .among physiological
and psychological authorities" imposed upon polygraph evidence by the Frye
decision goes more towards the higher standard of proof required for judi-
cial notice of fact than towards the standard of admissibility of scien-
tific evidence."5 Most court decisions subsequent to Frye have summarily
rejected attempts to introduce such evidence, having decided that the poly-
graph technique failed to meet the standard required for judicial notice, and
failed to subsequently test the utility of the evidence against the general stand-
ard for admissibility.60 In addition to the imposition upon polygraph evi-
dence of a higher standard of admissibility, the courts have interpreted
Frye as restricting the requirement of general scientific acceptance to experts
in the fields of physiology and psychology, even though the main holding
of the case calls for "general acceptance in the particular field in which it
[the polygraph] belongs." 67
However, the present trend is for the courts to grant judicial recognition to
scientific evidence if there is general acceptance by those who specialize in
that particular field of study. 8 In the field of polygraphy, John E. Reid
64. Kaplan 394.
65. The courts generally use judicial notice to declare the truth of an assertion
without requiring formal proof in the form of oral and written testimony. Judicial
notice serves as a catalyst to the trial procedure by deciding, in place of the jury, the
truth of facts generally so recognized by counsel for both sides. By definition, such a
finding requires a stricter standard of admission than that required for the general ad-
mission of scientific evidence. Where the court determines that the truth of a particu-
lar assertion is debatable, it generally leaves the issue of truth for the jury to resolve.
See generally C. MCCORMICK, LAw OF EVIDENCE ch. 35 (2d ed. 1972).
66. Professor McCormick analyzes the situation in the following manner:
"General scientific acceptance" is a proper condition for taking judicial notice
of scientific facts, but not a criterion for the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence. Any relevant conclusions which are supported by a qualified expert
witness should be received unless there are other reasons for exclusion ...
If the courts used this approach, instead of repeating a supposed requirement
of "general acceptance" not elsewhere imposed, they would arrive at a prac-
tical way of utilizing the results of scientific advances.
C. McCoRMIcK, LAW OF EvIDENCE § 203 (2d ed. 1972). See People v. Kenny, 167
Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348 (N.Y. Queens County Ct. 1938) and Boeche v. State,
151 Neb. 368, 378, 37 N.W.2d 593, 597 (1949) (Chappel, J., concurring opinion).
67. Frye v. United States, 293 F. at 1014.
68. REID & INBAU 237. See People v. Williams, 164 Cal. App. 2d 858, 331 P.2d
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and Fred E. Inbau, two of the leading authorities on the polygraph, have
affirmed that the accuracy and reliability of the polygraph technique is of a
high degree and compares quite favorably to other judicially recognized types
of scientific evidence, such as psychiatric testimony in insanity proceed-
ings, medical testimony regarding medical diagnosis, and testimony by hand-
writing, fingerprinting, blood-testing, and ballistics experts.69 While courts
must not limit acceptance of polygraph evidence solely to general proof of
its high degree of precision, a comparison of polygraph accuracy to that of
other types of scientific testimony warrants a careful consideration of the
relevancy of polygraph evidence before it is summarily excluded.
B. The Polygraph Examiner
It is generally acknowledged that the accuracy of polygraph evidence in the
discovery of truth and deception depends greatly upon the expertise dis-
played by the polygraph examiner in making a proper analysis of the
test results. 70 The examiner's ultimate decision as to whether or not the test
subject was telling the truth results from not only an examination of the
polygram record, but also a combination of factual information. In actual
practice, the examiner takes into account information regarding the case un-
der investigation as well as the subject's behavioral symptoms and attitudes
observed before, during, and after the examination. ". . . [The examiner] is
afforded the . . . opportunity to evaluate the attitude of the subject and to
make allowances for [any possible] condition which could cause an error in
interpretation of [p]olygraph records. '71 Because of his crucial role in inter-
preting the polygraph test results, emphasis is placed upon the achievement
of a high degree of professionalism, training and experience.
Aside from the objection of the strong prejudicial effect of polygraph evi-
dence on the jury, critics of the polygraph have expressed great concern
over the absence of mandatory standards of training and education to en-
sure a high degree of examiner competence; and this in turn is an important
reason for the lack of support for the use of polygraph evidence among
many attorneys and judges. Most polygraph examiners are either private
practitioners or are employed by the federal, state, or local government or
by law enforcement agencies. Only a minority have college degrees, and
many lack an adequate understanding of the underlying theory of the poly-
251 (1958) and Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163
(1960). Cf. Skolnick 703.
69. REID & INBAU 254-57.
70. Id. at 257. See Skolnick 707.
71. Horvath & Reid 281.
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graph technique. The usual training program covers only six weeks and
fails to produce truly qualified examiners. 72
While the problem of examiner expertise is well recognized, the poly-
graph profession has been unable to do much more than to suggest stand-
ards to be adhered to by its members. 73  In view of the magnitude of this
problem, a number of states have passed legislation regulating polygraph ex-
aminers. 74  While this legislation goes a long way towards alleviating the
problem of examiner incompetence, the statutes are uniformly insufficient
in their failure to specify any requirement of study in the sciences of psy-
chology and physiology. The absence of any experience in this area of
study significantly diminishes the value of the requirement of a bachelor's
degree. Nevertheless, such legislation has greatly aided the polygraph pro-
fession in its quest to insure a high degree of competency among its exam-
iners .75
Recent studies clearly establish that a qualified examiner is much more ac-
72. Skolnick 707 n.55.
73. The American Polygraph Association (APA) has a three-fold standard calling
for: 1) a college degree; 2) training in an accredited polygraph institute; and 3) ex-
perience from conducting at least 200 examinations. APA CONST. art. III, § 1, re-
printed in Comment, Lie Detector Tests: Possible Admissibility Upon Stipulation, 4
JOHN MAR. J. PRAC. & PRO. 244, 263 n.122 (1971).
[T]he courts should require the following: (1) That the examiner possess a
college degree. (2) That he has received at least six months of internship
training under an experienced, competent examiner or examiners) with a
sufficient volume of case work to afford frequent supervised testing in actual
case situations. (3) That the witness have at least five years' experience as a
specialist in the field of Polygraph examinations. (4) That the examiner's
testimony must be based upon Polygraph records that he produces in court and
which are available for cross examination purposes. REID & INBAU 257.
74. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 71-2201 to 71-2225 (Supp. 1971); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 493.40-493.56 (1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-5005 to 84-5008 (1972); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 202-1 to 202-30 (Supp. 1973); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. 33 329.010-
329.990 (1969); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 73-29-1 to 73-29-47 (1973); NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 648.005-648.210 (1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-31-1 to 67-31-14 (Supp. 1971);
N.D. CENT. CODE §3 43-31-01 to 43-31-17 (Supp. 1971); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art.
4413(29cc) (Supp. 1972); VA. CODE ANN. 33 54-729.03 to 54-729.018 (Supp. 1973).
The Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Mississippi, New Mexico, and Texas statutes create a
special licensing board composed of polygraph examiners. Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Illinois, Mississippi, and Texas require that the examiner hold a bachelor's degree from
an accredited college or (with the exception of Illinois) have completed five years of
investigative experience in lieu of a degree. Other provisions provide that the examiner
be trained by an accredited polygraph institute, plus professional examinations, a
period of internship, or both.
75. The issue of examiner expertise will ultimately have to be determined when the
polygraph examiner takes the stand. For a discussion of the character of the direct
examination and the cross examination undertaken to establish the qualifications of the
examiner, see State v. Fields, 434 S.W.2d 507, 511 (Mo. 1968) and State v. Valdez, 91
Ariz. 274, 283, 371 P.2d 894, 900 (1962). See also Note, The Admissibility of
Polygraph Lie-Detector Evidence Pursuant to Stipulation in Criminal Proceedings, 5
AKRON L. REV. 235, 244-47 (1972).
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curate in diagnosing truth or deception from analysis of polygraph records
than is an inexperienced examiner. 76 Professional and legislative regula-
tions serve as useful guides for the courts in determining not only whether a
polygraph expert is qualified to testify at trial but also whether the poly-
graph evidence is ultimately to be accepted.
C. The Polygraph Examinee
Many critics of the polygraph technique express concern over the danger of
an innocent subject obtaining an adverse judgment from a mistaken exam-
iner because of the presence of some physiological or mental abnor-
mality. They contend that an accurate test diagnosis is possible only where
the examinee is in good mental and physical condition at the time of the test
and that any physiological problems-such as irregular blood pressure, heart
disease, respiratory disorders, extreme nervousness, anxiety, anger, or ner-
vous tension-undetected by the examiner can lead to a "false positive
diagnosis."' 77  While it may be true that the presence of such irregularities
will affect the readings produced by the polygraph, proponents maintain
that these factors are readily ascertainable by a competent examiner, ei-
ther from the readings themselves or from the visible demeanor of the test
subject, and that the examiner will subsequently consider the presence of
such abnormalities in his overall analysis of the test results.78 A well-trained,
experienced polygraph examiner conducting the test of a possibly abnormal
subject, either alone or in the company of a competent psychologist, should
be able to recognize the presence of any physiological or psychological con-
ditions and take their presence into account in arriving at a diagnosis. In
addition, most investigations into the degree of accuracy of the interpreta-
tion of polygraph test results indicate that the polygraph examiner is more
inclined to mistakenly find a guilty subject innocent than he is to find de-
ception on the part of an innocent subject. In other words, the margin of
error actually favors the guilty examinee. 79
D. The Jury
Perhaps the strongest objection to the admissibility of polygraph evidence
is one that does not even deal with the issue of the reliability or accuracy
76. Horvath & Reid, 281. See also REm & INBAu 234.
77. Highleyman, supra note 55, at 60-61.
78. REID & INBAU 184-202. The authors recognize that certain classes of individ-
uals-i'e. young children, intoxicated or drugged individuals, persons suffering from
serious heart disease, idiots, and imbeciles-are unfit subjects for examination. Psy-
chotics are usually recognized during the examination, while psychopaths and psy-
choneurotics normally produce inconclusive test results.
79. Horvath & Reid 279.
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of the evidence. Rather, the objection lies in the overbearing prejudicial
effect of the evidence, notwithstanding its probative value, on the jury and
the concomitant tendency of the jury to treat such evidence as conclusive
proof of the defendant's guilt or innocence without deciding the case on all
its merits. District Judge Irving R. Kaufman expressed this sentiment clearly
in United States v. Stromberg:80
The most important function served by a jury is in bringing its ac-
cumulated experience to bear upon witnesses testifying before it,
in order to distinguish truth from falsity. . . It is the basic
premise of the jury system that twelve men and women can har-
monize those variables and decide, with the aid of examination
and cross-examination, the truthfulness of a witness. . . I
am not prepared to rule that the jury system is as yet outmoded.
I still prefer the collective judgment of twelve men and women
who have sat through many weeks of trial and heard all the evi-
dence on the guilt or innocence of a defendant. 8'
This prejudicial potential may be alleviated to a certain degree by restrict-
ing the scope of the examiner's testimony to the veracity of the defendant's
answers to the relevant questions of the polygraph exam. The examiner
should never be permitted to express his opinion as to whether or not the
subject is guilty or innocent of the crime charged against him.82 A vigorous
cross-examination of the polygraph examiner should expose relevant inade-
quacies in the testimony of the witness and subsequently lessen its impact
on the jury. Additional information concerning the degree of the examiner's
qualifications, the nature of the test conditions, a professional opinion as
to the possibility of error in his interpretation, and the possible presence of
adverse physiological and psychological factors should aid the jury in plac-
ing the polygraph examiner's testimony in its proper perspective. In addi-
tion to cross-examination of the examiner, the jury should be instructed both
prior to and subsequent to the admission of the polygraph evidence to the
effect that: 1) the examiner's conclusions must not be considered as proof
of any element of the crime; 2) the jury should consider this evidence in con-
junction with all other evidence presented to the court; and 3) the jury must
disregard the polygraph evidence if they find that the defendant failed to vol-
untarily consent to the examination.
While cross-examination and accurate jury instruction go a long way to-
wards alleviating the prejudicial impact of polygraph evidence on the jury,
normally the trial judge will ultimately decide whether or not the probative
80. 179 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
81. Id. at 280. See also People v. Leone, 25 N.Y.2d 511, 255 N.E.2d 696, 307
N.Y.S.2d 430 (1969).
82. United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. at 691.
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value of the examiner's testimony outweighs its prejudicial nature under
the circumstances of the particular case.
E. Fifth Amendment Limitations
The testimonial nature of the polygraph examination proceeding necessitates
consideration of the impact of such evidence vis-d-vis the defendant's con-
stitutional privilege against self-incrimination. In Schmerber v. California,88
the Supreme Court upheld the involuntary extraction of a blood sample from
a hospital patient suspected of drunken driving to determine the level of
alcoholic content. Rejecting the petitioner's claim that the invasion was in
violation of his privilege against self-incrimination under the fifth amend-
ment, the Court held that the privilege applied only to "evidence of a testi-
monial or communicative nature"84 and not to evidence obtained solely
from exposure of the suspect to physical observation or scientific examina-
tion.8 5 The court indirectly alluded to the status of polygraph evidence in
relation to the fifth amendment:
Some tests seemingly directed to obtain 'physical evidence,' for ex-
ample, lie detector tests measuring changes in body function dur-
ing interrogation, may actually be directed to eliciting responses
which are essentially testimonial. To compel a person to submit
to testing in which an effort will be made to determine his guilt
or innocence on the basis of physiological responses, whether willed
or not, is to evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth Amendment.
Such situations call to mind the principle that the protection of the
privilege 'is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to
guard,' Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562.86
Aside from this brief allusion to -the polygraph in Schmerber, no court has
as yet acted specifically on the issue of whether or not the results of poly-
graph examinations are within the scope of protection furnished by the fifth
amendment. Nonetheless, the Schmerber dicta makes rather tenuous the
assertion that polygraph evidence is analogous to fingerprints, blood tests,
and line-up identifications in that the evidence is "physical" rather than
"testimonial" in nature. The basic theory of polygraphy that links the ex-
aminee's physiological changes to his psychological state of mind interprets
such readings as being basically communicative.8 7
Assuming that an individual has the right under the fifth amendment to
83. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
84. Id. at 761.
85. Id. at 764.
86. Id.
87. Skolnick 725.
[Vol. 23: 101
Polygraph Evidence
refuse to take a polygraph test,88 he likewise has the right to waive his privi-
lege against self-incrimination, assuming that he has received clear and ade--
quate warning that the results of such a test could be used against him.8
9
Thus, a suspect who so voluntarily consents to take a polygraph test may
be considered to have intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimi-
nation.90
The objection to admission of polygraph evidence on these constitutional
grounds is, for the most part, academic since a polygraph examination can-
not produce truly reliable results without the full cooperation of the exam-
inee. The Ridling opinion expands on this fact to argue that polygraph evi-
dence falls outside of the fifth amendment privilege:
With the polygraph, there can be no coercion at the time the test
is taken if it is to be a valid test. The evidence offered is the opin-
ion of the expert that the witness is or is not telling the truth
when he voluntarily makes a statement. It is another way of sup-
porting or attacking credibility. It is not a violation of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. 1
In the event that the courts decide to apply the fifth amendment to
the polygraph test, polygraph evidence presented by the prosecution should
be accompanied by a formal written stipulation signed by the defendant, his
counsel, and the prosecuting attorney. Such a stipulation should attest to
the suspect's knowing and intelligent waiver of the privilege against self-
incrimination through his voluntary submission to the polygraph examination
and his agreement to the admissibility of the subsequent test results in evi-
dence--either against him or on his behalf. A further safeguard would
be to allow counsel for the examinee to examine the test questions prior to
their use or to be present during the examination in order to observe the
polygraph technique and the results of the test.92
IV. Conclusion
In the fifty years since Frye v. United States, precedents have been estab-
lished in the state and federal courts opposed to the admission of the results
and interpretation of polygraph examinations into evidence. Most cases
subsequent to Frye have erroneously interpreted that decision as requiring
88. Likewise, evidence of a suspect's refusal to submit to a polygraph test is in-
admissible as evidence of his guilt. People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P.2d
937 (1948).
89. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964).
90. People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P.2d 937 (1948).
91. United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. at 97-98. See also Kaplan 401.
92. 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 990 (3d ed, Chadborn rev. 1970).
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a higher standard of admissibility in the case of polygraph evidence than in
the case of other forms of scientific evidence. The Ridling, DeBetham, and
Zeiger decisions, when presented side-by-side, reflect a present mood of
the courts to take a closer look at the rule of rejection set forth in the Frye
decision and to admit expert testimony presented in an attempt to lay an ade-
quate foundation to reveal the general reliability of the polygraph technique
and to establish the probative value of polygraph evidence.93 As a conse-
quence, the issue of admissibility is being decided, not on the traditional
criterion required for judicial notice of fact, but rather by the general stand-
ard of admissibility: 1) evidence of a generally recognized theory behind
the practice; 2) presence of a competent examiner; 3) proof of proper test
procedure; and 4) a ruling by the trial judge that the probative value of the
evidence succeeds in counterbalancing its prejudicial character. 94
In United States v. Ridling, Judge Joiner made extensive use of the new
proposed Federal Rules of Evidence in arriving at his decision to admit the
evidence of the polygraph experts' opinions.9 5 Until these rules have been
in force for a period of time, the exact nature of their impact on the use of
polygraph evidence cannot be adequately measured. However, there ap-
pears to be a general consensus that the new rules will broaden the range
of admissible evidence where it can be shown that the evidence sought to be
admitted is relevant.96
Since polygraph evidence was first declared inadmissible in 1923, the
polygraph profession has matured into an established field of science. While
the precise boundaries of its underlying theory have not been completely
mapped by the scientific community, enough knowledge has been obtained
through extensive scientific study and investigation to confirm the belief that
93. None of the three decisions felt constrained by stare decisis from considering
the issue of the reliability of the polygraph technique. Each case referred to United
States v. Wainwright, 413 F.2d 796 (10th Cir. 1969) in support of the presumption
that the issue of acceptability had to be considered in each individual case. United
States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. at 94; United States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. at
1380; and United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. at 687 n.5.
94. See notes 61-63 supra and accompanying text.
95. Judge Joiner stressed that the evidence satisfied the requirements of relevancy
under FED. R. EVID. 401, that the court had the power to appoint polygraph experts
under FED. R. EVID. 706, and that the main consideration in support of admission was
the ability of the evidence to aid the jury in its search for truth-FED. R. EvID. 702.
96. See generally Weinstein & Berger, Basic Rules of Relevancy in the Proposed Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, 4 GA. L. REV. 43 (1969); Schwartz, The Proposed Federal Rules
of Evidence: An Introduction and Critique, 38 U. CIN. L. REV. 449 (1969); Sym-
posium: Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1969 L. & Soc. ORDER 509 (1970);
Comments, Major Changes Under the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, Parts I &
11, 37 TENN. L. REV. 556, 557 (1970); A Panel (Baylor, Jenner, Jr., Joiner, Selvin,
and Coccia), Proposed Rules of Evidence For The United States District Courts And
Magistrates, 37 INS. COUNSEL J. 565 (1970).
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the polygraph can render an invaluable service in the detection of truth and
deception. This faith in the utility of the polygraph technique is mani-
fested by its extensive use by government, private industry, and particularly
law enforcement agencies. A growing number of courts have recognized
the value of the polygraph in the pre-trial stages of criminal and civil litiga-
tion.97 In many cases, the decision of whether or not to initiate further in-
vestigation or to prosecute a suspect rests squarely on the outcome of a poly-
graph examination. Thus, while most courts have excluded polygraph evi-
dence at trial, the results of such tests have at times carried the pervasive ef-
fect of conclusive evidence of one's guilt or innocence at the pre-trial stage.
United States v. Ridling may well be one of the first federal court deci-
sions to herald the arrival of judicial recognition of polygraph evidence. De-
pending on one's point of view, the opinion is either an overdue acknowledge-
ment of the usefulness of the polygraph in the discovery of truth or an ero-
sion of the function of the jury as the ultimate finder of fact. The rate at
which the courts will follow the Ridling decision depends primarily upon
how well the polygraph profession is able, either on its own or by the aid of
legislation, to increase the overall level of competence among its members.
While the court in DeBetham discounted the necessity of regulatory legisla-
tion of polygraph examiners,9 8 it is fairly certain that most courts will balk
at making general use of polygraph evidence in the absence of legislation
requiring the uniform examination and licensing of polygraph operators. 99
Timothy I. Reagan
97. REID & INBAU 226-34. See State v. Cole, 354 Mo. 181, 188 S.W.2d 43 (1945);
State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147 (1947); Leeks v. State, 95 Okla. Crim.
326, 245 P.2d 764 (1952); Davis v. State, 165 Tex. Crim. 456, 308 S.W.2d 880 (1957).
The use of polygraph test results by a grand jury is generally upheld: Costello v.
United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956); West v. United States, 359 F.2d 50 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 867 (1966). Polygraph exams may be a useful tool in evaluat-
ing information supplied by police informants. See Blum & Osterloh, The Polygraph
Examination as a Means For Detecting Truth and Falsehood in Stories Presented by
Police Informants, 59 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 133 (1968).
98. 348 F. Supp. at 1386.
99. State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 280, 371 P.2d 894, 898 (1962); cf. Parker v.
Friendt, 99 Ohio App. 329, 337, 118 N.E.2d 216, 222 (1954). See Note, supra note
52, at 352.
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